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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-THREAT OF Mon VIOLENCE As
JUSTIFICATION FOR REsTRAINT ON EXERCISE OF RIGHT To TRAVEL IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-Pursuant to a plan to test for racial segregation
in interstate commerce facilities, white and Negro students traveled
through Alabama on an interstate bus journey. In Birmingham and
Anniston, the students were assaulted by members of the Ku Klux Klan
and other conspirators; at or near Anniston one of the buses was destroyed.
On arrival at Montgomery, the students were again assaulted and intimidated by members of the Ku Klux Klan and various other individuals.
The Montgomery police, with full knowledge of the impending violence,
did nothing to protect the personal safety of the interstate travelers.
The plaintiff, United States, initiated proceedings, seeking a preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants, the Ku Klux Klan and others,
from interfering with the travel of passengers into and through Alabama.
Two of the defendants, Montgomery officials, then petitioned the court
to issue a temporary restraining order against the students and the
various groups1 suppo11ting ·them to prevent further use of the interstate
facilities in the state. Held, preliminary injunction against the defendants
and temporary restraining order against the students and their supporters
granted. Although the defendants were unlawfully interfering with the
acknowledged rights of the students and although the inactivity of the
Montgomery police force consdtuted "state action" in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 the peaceful
activity of the students and ·their supporters was an undue burden on
interstate commerce. United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux
Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
The civil strife resulting from peaceful demonstrations in hostile
communicies often creates the difficulty of preserving individual rights
without sacrificing the public's interest in maintaining peace and order
within the community. As various interest groups have sought to restrict
the activity of others, the federal courts have been increasingly called
upon -to distinguish permissible agitation from that which is deemed too
great an invasion of the public interest. The courts must weigh the
individual's rights of freedom of expression,3 assembly4 and travel11 against
1 Foremost among these was the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Other groups
and individuals affected by the court's decree included the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Student Nashville Non-Violent Movement, and Martin Luther
King, Jr.
2 The court details facts which leave no question about the willful nature of the
failure of the Montgomery officials to perform their duty. Principal case at 900. For
a recent decision involving inaction as unlawful state action in violation of the equal
protection clause, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
3 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4 See Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
II See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).

1962]

RECENT DECISIONS

803

the various state or national interests threatened. Verbalizations concerning
the value and preferred status of certain constitutional rights, followed
by the inseparable admonition •that these rights are not absolute,
accomplish nothing more than a restatement of the particular balancing
problem confronting the court. Once these traditional generalizations
have been invoked, the court, in seeking to resolve the conflict, may well
search in vain for judicial precedent which is pertinent or helpful.
Arguably ·the questionable wisdom of the decree in the instant case
stems from an over-reliance upon several incontrovertible legal propo.siitions. Assuming the appropriateness of -the injunctions against the various
groups interfering with the interstate travelers, the obvious question is
why the court felt compelled to go beyond ,the relief sought by the
government and restrain the students as well. The court's opinion
justified this decree primarily on tlle strength of two general principles:
tlle broad and flexible equitable powers of the district courts to enjoin
conduct deleterious to the public interest,6 and the non-absolute nature
of the constitutional rights of the "Freedom Riders.'' 7 Obviously the
power to issue a certain type of decree is not a justification for doing
so in any particular instance. And the faot •that the right to travel in
interstate commerce is not absolute in no way lessens the need to justify
the curtailment of that right. The court's reference to cases deciding that
the public interest was paramount to an individual's rights to operate
sound trucks8 or to parade through city streets9 seems meaningless absent
a showing of analogous circumstances. Furthermore, the court's statement
that the restraining order was not directed at "bona fide" travelers in interstate commerce10 does not provide any satisfactory justification for a restriction of constitutional rights. A bus ride to vindicate one's rights as a citizen
of the United States could only be considered "non-bona fide" in the sense
that the trips were planned and well organized. Organized group action of
this nature is a concomitant of the right to peaceful demonstration and
seems preferable to the probable results of "spontaneous" protest activity.
The court's reasoning is not entirely responsive to the crucial issue
of whether the facts demonstrated a continuing tlu-eat of a burden on
interstate commerce sufficient to justify the curtailment of constitutional
liberties. It is at once apparent that compliance with the injunctions
sought by the United States should have lifted the burden from interstate
commerce. Thus the necessity of a further exercise of judicial power
seems predicated upon the contemplated ineffectiveness of the court's
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (b).
See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-95 (1950);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
8 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
9 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
10 Principal case at 906.
7
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mandate. Since the court found that the activity of the defendants was
directly responsible for the burden on interstate commerce, the court's
finding that the activity of the students and integrationist groups was
also responsible11 presents difficulty. Without the unlawful action of
defendants there would have been no violence and consequently no
burden on interstate commerce. While logically this is equally true of
the student's lawful activity, the finding ,that rhe students were also
directly causing the burden on interstate commerce must be based on a
theory which I.isolates the violent reactions of defendants and considers
them purely as a passive constant. Any activity which releases this potential
reservoir of violence is then -the cause of the violence. It would seem that
compelling circumstances should be present before constitutional l'ights
are restricted for ·threatening public harm when the causation is of this
mrture, While the court recognized the principle ,that the threat of mob
violence is no excuse for the failure of the oou11t 1:0 issue an injunction
to protect the constitutional rights of private citizens,12 it dis,tinguished
the present case on two grounds, neither of which is completely convincing.
The fact ,that the injunction sought by ,the United States was granted
does not appear to be an important distinction since ,the court then
restraiined the exercise of the very right which the injunction against
defendants was I.intended to secure. Nor was it entirely clear that further
testing of "local customs" would "frustrate" pending litigation involving
a determination of the legality of racial discrimination in local bus
terminals. 13 A finding othat even after the defendants' conduct had been
effectively enjoined ·there remained a threat of an undue burden on interstate commerce should have been a prerequisite to the restriction of the
students' rights. The court simply stated that there was a burden, but
other than a reference to some disruption in the bus scheduling there is
no indication of any serious interruption of ,the flow of commerce. 14 And
the order was not sought by the carriers, but by the defendants who had
Id. at 904.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 16 (1958). In this case the district court had
granted the request of the Little Rocle School Board to suspend for two and one-half
years the operation of the School Board's court approved desegregation plan, finding
that implementation of the plan had resulted in tension, bedlam, chaos and turmoil
which disrupted the educational process. In affirming the Fifth Circuit's reversal, the
Supreme Court said, "Thus law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving
the Negro children of their constitutional rights." 358 U.S. at 16.
13 If the court meant to say that further testing is senseless since the pending litigation will settle everything, by the same reasoning, most lawful agitation of this
nature is equally without purpose. Barring other complicating factors this question
should probably be a matter for the interested groups themselves to determine.
14 There was of course violence in Anniston and Birmingham on the particular day
on which the events described in the principal case took place. However, there is no
indication that the defendants had, or threatened to, ignore the temporary restraining
order which the court issued prior to the decision in principal case.
11
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already been enjoined for contributing to ,the very burden for which they
then unabashedly professed concern. Thus it appears that ·the opinion
justified the restriction of constitutional rights on the basis of broad
propooitions of law without a convincing showing that the facts called
for their application.
Two phenomona of the mid-twentieth century-a large racial
minority actively pressing for "equality," and ,the unprecedented legal
activity of the federal government in protecting minority rights-suggest
that cases of this nature will increase in number. It is submitted that they
require a candid recognition by the courts that a difficult evaluation is
presented in which a thorough analysis of the factual and social background is often more important than judicial theory. Once the court is
satisfied that a particular group is •the cause of a substantial -threat to the
public interest, a variety of factors, depending upon the facts of the
particular case, must be weighed before a decision is made. After all
else is considered, the court must weigh the gravity of the threatened
harm against the individual rights involved. Often, as in the principal
case, consideration should be given to the possibility that restricting
the rights of individuals because of the violence of others will only
encourage such violence in future situations. This will protect the
nation's interest in maintaining a society in which the right to travel and
to demonstrate peacefully is determined, not by the Ku Klux Klan, but

by law.
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